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FAITHLESS OR FAITHFUL ELECTORS? AN ANALOGY TO
DISOBEDIENT BUT CONSCIENTIOUS JURORS
Jeffrey Abramson ∗
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that on November 3, 2020, President Trump loses the popular vote
but apparently wins the Electoral College by a margin of 274 to 264. However,
five of the electors who pledged to vote for Trump announce that they cannot in
good conscience vote for a candidate who lost the national popular vote. When
the Electoral College ballots are officially cast on December 14, they therefore
vote for Mike Pence, knowing this will deprive Trump of the majority he needs
to win. The result throws the election into the House of Representatives to decide
who wins.
Or imagine that the Democratic Party candidate narrowly wins both the
popular vote and apparently a bare majority (271) of electoral votes. However,
on December 14, two electors supposed to vote for the victorious Democrat do
not, citing concerns about the physical well- being of the candidate. They write
in the name of former Secretary of State Colin Powell instead. Their defections
also throw the election into the House.
Scenarios such as these could happen. 1 In 2016, ten electors cast ballots for
presidential candidates other than those the popular vote in their states directed
them to support. 2 Three states refused to count the ballots, 3 but four other states

∗
Professor of Law and Fellow of the Hines H. Baker and Thelma Kelley Baker Chair in Law, University
of Texas School of Law, and Professor of Government and Fellow of the Frank C. Erwin, Jr. Centennial Chair
in Government, University of Texas. The author wishes to thank Jeffrey Tulis of the University of Texas at
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staff of the Emory Law Journal.
1
In 1876, Rutherford Hayes defeated Samuel Tilden by a single contested electoral vote. See
JACQUELINE JONES, ET AL., CREATED EQUAL: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 488, Table 15.4 (2009). In
2000, George Bush achieved the necessary majority in the Electoral College by a single vote. BUSH V. GORE:
THE COURT CASE AND COMMENTARIES xiv (E. J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001). In 1836, the refusal
of Virginia Democratic electors to vote for Richard Johnson, the victorious vice-presidential candidate of their
party, threw that election into the Senate. See Brian C. Kalt, Of Death and Deadlocks: Section 4 of the Twentieth
Amendment, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 111 (2017).
2
See Jesse Wegman, Why Do We Have an Electoral College Again?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/01/25/opinion/sunday/electoral-college-supreme-court.html?searchResultPosition=1.
3
The three states were Colorado, Maine, and Minnesota. See Kiersten Schmidt & Wilson Andrews, A
Historic Number of Electors Defected, and Most Were Supposed to Vote for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/19/us/elections/electoral-college-results.html.
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accepted the other seven votes from so-called “faithless electors.” 4 This was the
largest outbreak of elector resistance in a century. 5
The term “faithless elector” is unfortunate, since the accusatory adjective
begs the question: Are electors required to vote in accordance with the popular
vote in their states or did the Constitution create an Electoral College precisely
to give electors some discretion in how they vote? For this reason, I refer in this
Essay to “independent” electors. 6 And I offer an analogy between independent
electors and independent jurors. In the case of jurors, we dispense with the usual
importance of holding government actors accountable for violating their oaths
of office. As with electors, we require that jurors pledge to follow their lawful
instructions. But we do not punish jurors who violate that oath. In fact, we
frequently honor them for rendering verdicts according to conscience. The
question is whether the Constitution extends to electors a similar kind of
discretion to break their oath with impunity and to have their independent vote
counted.
To answer that question, the Court has taken two cases for decision this
term, 7 one from Colorado, the other from Washington. The Colorado case arose
after Hillary Clinton won that state’s popular vote in the 2016 presidential
election. 8 Like thirty-two other states 9 and the District of Columbia, 10 Colorado
requires a pledge from presidential electors to follow the state’s popular vote. 11
However, one elector violated both his pledge and state law by attempting to
cast a presidential ballot for John Kasich, instead of Clinton. Colorado’s
Secretary of State removed him as an elector, declined to accept his ballot, and
replaced him with an alternate elector who cast a “proper” ballot for the winner
4

The seven votes occurred in Washington (4), Texas (2), and Hawaii (1). Id.
Id.
6
Electors can claim independence in two related ways. First, they can claim they are free and not bound
to vote according to the popular vote in their respective states. Secondly, like any independent voter, they can
claim that they should not be bound by any partisan or political party affiliation.
7
As of this writing, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Court has postponed oral arguments this term
until further notice.
8
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 18-1173, 2020 WL
254162 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020), consolidated with In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807 (Wash. 2019), cert. granted sub nom.
Chiafalo v. Washington, No. 19-465, 2020 WL 254167 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020). On March 10, 2020, the Court
announced that it is no longer consolidating the Colorado and Washington cases.
9
See Brief for South Dakota et al. as Amicus Curiae at 1, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, No. 19-518 (U.S.
Nov. 20, 2019); see also The Electoral College, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/the_electoral_college#
faithless_elector_state_laws (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
10
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.08(g)(2) (West 2018).
11
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-304(5) (West 2019) (requiring pledge to “vote for the presidential
candidate, and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate who received the highest number of votes at the
preceding general election in the state”).
5
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of the State’s popular vote. 12 In the Washington case, 13 three electors similarly
violated state law by casting votes for former Secretary of State Colin Powell,
rather than for Hillary Clinton, the winner of the state’s popular vote. A fourth
voted for Faith Spotted Eagle. 14 However, unlike Colorado, Washington
accepted and recorded the four votes and then imposed a fine on the electors, as
authorized by state law. 15
In both Colorado and Washington, the independent Democratic electors
were apparently responding to a national effort to persuade enough Republican
electors pledged to vote for Donald Trump to vote for another Republican,
thereby denying Trump a majority in the Electoral College and throwing the
election into the House. 16 At the time, Republicans held the majority in the
House. By not voting for Clinton, the Democratic electors were trying to show
Republican electors that they were not trying to elect Clinton, but were instead
setting an example they hoped Republicans would follow by deserting Trump. 17
It would have taken thirty-seven Republican electors pledged to vote for Trump
to defect, for this strategy to have worked. 18

12
Two other Colorado electors were prepared to cast wayward ballots but refrained from doing so after
witnessing the removal of their fellow wayward elector. Baca, 935 F.3d at 901, 904.
13
In re Guerra, 441 P.3d. 807 (Wash. 2019), consolidated with Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d
887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, No. 19-465, 2020 WL 254167 (U.S. Jan.
17, 2020). But cf. supra note 8 (the Court is no longer consolidating the Colorado and Washington cases).
14
Schmidt, supra note 3.
15
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.56.340 (West 2016); David Gutman, 4 Washington State Electors
Decided Not to Vote for Hillary Clinton in 2016, SEATTLE TIMES (May 24, 2019) https://www.seattletimes.
com/seattle-news/politics/states-high-court-upholds-1000-fines-for-rogue-electors-who-didnt-vote-for-hillaryclinton-in-2016. In 2019, Washington amended its law so as to remove and replace any elector who violates the
required pledge to abide by the results of the popular vote in the state. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.56.090
(West Supp. 2019). This new law is modeled after the Uniform Commission’s Faithful Presidential Electors Act,
which has been adopted by five other states. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, UNIFORM FAITHFUL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS ACT 7–8, 11 (2010).
16
Ed Pilkington, Electoral College’s ‘Faithless Electors’ Fail to Stop Trump but Land Democratic Blow,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/19/electoral-college-revoltfaithless-electors-analysis.
17
See Peter Beinart, The Electoral College Was Meant to Stop Men Like Trump from Being President,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/the-electoral-college-wasmeant-to-stop-men-like-trump-from-being-president/508310 (stating that Trump presidency is so “terrifying” in
“unprecedented ways” that “for the first time in modern American history, there’s a plausible case for urging the
electors to vote their consciences”).
18
Jeffrey K. Tulis, Sanford Levinson, & Jeremi Suri, The Hail Mary Pass that Could Deny Donald Trump
the Presidency: It’s up to You, Electors, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.nydailynews.com/
opinion/tulis-levinson-suri-hail-mary-defeat-donald-trump-article-1.2882315.
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PRE-RATIFICATION AND POST-RATIFICATION VIEWS ON THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE

The Constitution does not address the issue of pledge-bound electors. It
could not have, since the framers did not require states to involve the people at
all in presidential elections. 19 Article II says only that each state shall appoint its
presidential electors “in such Manner as [its] Legislature may direct.” 20
In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton certainly expected the Electoral College
to weed out candidates distinguished only by “talents for low intrigue” or
practiced in “the little arts of popularity.” 21 Electors would be statesmen most
likely “to possess the information and discernment” necessary to protect the
presidency from a demagogue or a candidate under foreign influence. 22
While the Court frequently turns to the Federalist Papers for help in
interpreting the Constitution, 23 those writings are of little help in probing the
Electoral College provisions. Consistent constitutional practice soon after
ratification has been for every state to hold popular elections as their way of
appointing electors. 24 Hamilton’s pre-ratification views cannot be a guide to
what became our constitutional norm only after ratification. 25 Rather than
fulfilling the expectations of the Federalist Paper authors, presidential elections
quickly reflected the writings of Antifederalists, who wondered whether “free
people [could] resign their right of suffrage into other hands besides their own”
and whether “it [is] rational, that the sacred rights of mankind should thus
dwindle down to Electors of electors.” 26 In 1892, the Supreme Court noted that,
as to independent voting by electors, “the original expectation may be said to
have been frustrated.” 27

19
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to
vote for electors for the President of the United States. . . .”).
20
U.S. CONST. art. II.
21
THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
22
Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (“[T]he aim of
every political constitution is . . . to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue
to pursue, the common good . . . .”).
23
Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here Than Meets
the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 246–47 (2005).
24
See Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the
Perils of Sub-Constitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173, 182 (2011).
25
See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional Construction, and the Problem of Faithless
Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 926–27 (2017).
26
Republicus, ANTI-FEDERALIST NO. 72.
27
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892); see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 n.16 (1952)
(electors had “degenerated into mere agents” as early as the first election).
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Today, a majority of states codify constitutional reality in laws requiring
electors to pledge to vote the people’s will. 28 After the Twenty-Third
Amendment gave electoral votes to the District of Columbia, Congress
legislated the same pledge for District electors. 29
The problem is that, alongside the dominant constitutional norm of electors
merely rubber-stamping the popular vote in their states, 30 there has remained a
steady if smaller tradition of independent electors. Seventeen states do not have
a law binding how electors must vote, 31 though some of them rely on what they
call an “honor system.” 32
Depending on how one counts, there have been as many as 184 instances of
independent voting. 33 The first occurred in 1796, in the first contested
presidential election, when a Federalist elector broke his vow by voting for
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson rather than John Adams. 34 Adams
won the Electoral College by only three votes. The last occurred in 2016, when
Congress recorded seven independent electoral votes for President and six for
Vice President. 35
Prior to 2016, no state had ever punished an elector for going against the
popular vote. 36 And no state threw out an independent ballot until Colorado did
so. 37 Given this history, what is new are recent efforts to remove and/or punish
independent electors. 38 For example, in 1968, Congress debated at length

28
See, e.g., In re Guerra, 441 P.3d. 807, 808 n.1 (Wash. 2019), consolidated with Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of
State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, No. 19-465, 2020 WL
254167 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020). But cf. supra note 8 (the Court is no longer consolidating the Colorado and
Washington cases).
29
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.08(g)(2) (West 2018).
30
See, e.g., Spreckels v. Graham, 228 P. 1040, 1045 (Cal. 1924) (stating that an elector’s function is
“nothing more than clerical”).
31
The Electoral College, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/the_electoral_college#faithless_elector_
state_laws (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
32
See, e.g., Brief for South Dakota et. al as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9.
33
Faithless Electors, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/the_electoral_college#faithless_electors (last
visited Mar. 30, 2020).
34
Baca, 935 F.3d at 948. A Philadelphia newspaper reporter asked, “What, do I chuse Samuel Miles to
determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be President? No I chuse him to act not to
think.” Id.
35
163 CONG. REC. 189 (2017).
36
Guerra, 441 P.3d at 818 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (“The State’s authority to penalize its electors is an
issue of first impression.”).
37
Baca, 935 F.3d. at 949 (“[W]e are aware of no instance in which Congress has failed to count an
anomalous vote, or in which a state—before Colorado—has attempted to remove an elector in the process of
voting, or to nullify a faithless vote.”).
38
See Faithless Elector Issue Does Not Affect Operation of National Popular Vote, NATIONAL POPULAR
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whether to accept an independent vote for George Wallace from a North
Carolina elector who should have voted for Richard Nixon. After debate, both
houses voted against a motion to throw out the ballot. 39
II. THE LOWER COURTS SPLIT
The Supreme Court’s decision will turn largely on how it interprets Article
II’s reserving to each state the power to appoint presidential electors “in such
Manner as [its] Legislature may direct.” 40 Both the Washington Supreme Court
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that this plenary power over
appointment gives states the right to condition an elector’s appointment on a
pledge to vote at the Electoral College in accordance with the popular vote in
the state. 41 But then the two courts split. The Washington court found that the
state was properly exercising its constitutional power over an elector’s
appointment when it punished him or her for violating the condition of the
appointment, namely the pledge.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Once electors are appointed by the state, the
appointed electors become federal officers exercising a federal function. 42 The
state’s appointment power over electors is at an end and nothing in Article II or
the Twelfth Amendment gives a state a further right to control how the elector
finally votes. Instead, those provisions make clear that “every step thereafter is
expressly delegated to a different body,” namely Congress, carrying out
“detailed instructions set forth in the Constitution itself.” 43 Among those
instructions are that electors are to “vote by ballot,” sign and certify their votes,
and “transmit” them to the President of the Senate. For the Tenth Circuit, “[t]he
plain language of the Constitution [is] that, once a vote is cast, it must be
included in the certified list sent to the President of the Senate.” 44 For this reason,
the court concluded, the state wholly lacks “power . . . to remove an elector who
votes in a manner unacceptable to the state or to strike that vote.” 45

VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/faithless-elector-issue-does-not-affect-operation-national-popular-vote
(stating that prior to the 1960s, no state had a law requiring electors to precommit to how they would vote).
39
See Baca, 935 F.3d at 950 (citing 115 CONG. REC. 246 (1969)).
40
U.S. CONST. art. II
41
Baca, 935 F.3d at 939; Guerra, 441 P.3d at 813.
42
Baca, 935 F.3d at 940.
43
Id. at 942–43.
44
Id. at 943.
45
Id. The Colorado court’s argument leaves open the possibility that Washington acted constitutionally
in counting a wayward vote but punishing the elector, while Colorado went too far in throwing out the vote.
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The Tenth Circuit buttressed its defense of independent electors with an
“original meaning” argument. Here, the court focused on key terms in Article II
or the Twelfth Amendment, such as electors are “to vote” or “to cast a ballot,”
as those terms would have been understood at the time of the Constitution’s
adoption or the amendment’s ratification. 46 Turning to contemporaneous
dictionaries, the court found that a voter or elector was a “chuser,” and that to
cast a ballot was to make a free or discretionary choice. 47
For all their differences, both the Washington court and the Tenth Circuit
turned to the same leading 1952 Supreme Court precedent. In Ray v. Blair, the
Court upheld an Alabama law that permitted political parties to require a binding
pledge from its slate of electors to vote for the party’s candidate. 48 The Court
rejected the argument that the Constitution gives such “absolute freedom” to an
elector “to vote his own choice” that a state cannot restrict that freedom by
extracting any sort of precommitment. 49 The Washington court stressed this part
of the Ray decision. By contrast, for the Tenth Circuit, what was decisive was
an odd distinction the Ray Court went on to draw. It was one thing to agree that
states had the right to extract a pledge from electors to abide by the state’s
popular vote result. It was quite another, the Court opined, to say that that the
pledge if broken was “legally enforceable.” Without deciding the issue, the Ray
Court left open the possibility that states could extract a pledge from electors
and yet not be able to punish them for violating the pledge, due to “an assumed
constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution . . . to vote as he may
choose in the electoral college.” 50
In their argument before the Washington Supreme Court, lawyers for the
independent electors argued that Ray thus recognized a distinction between the
“moral authority” of a pledge and its “legal enforceability.” 51 An amicus brief
from South Dakota in the pending Colorado case expressed confusion about
such a distinction, arguing that “if it is constitutional to exact a pledge to support
a party’s nominee as a condition of serving as an elector, it necessarily follows
that there is some constitutional means of enforcing that pledge.” 52

46

U.S. CONST art. II; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
Id. at 944.
48
343 U.S. 214, 225 (1952).
49
Id. at 228.
50
Id. at 230 (“[E]ven if such promises of candidates for the electoral college are legally
unenforceable . . .”).
51
In re Guerra, 441 P.3d. 807, 816 n.9 (Wash. 2019).
52
Brief of Amicus Curiae South Dakota, supra note 9.
47

ABRAMSONFINAL_4.14.20

2046

4/21/2020 3:33 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 69

By agreeing to hear the two independent elector cases, the Court seems
poised to answer the question left open by Ray. It is possible that the Supreme
Court might strike a middle ground and uphold both lower court decisions. It
could agree that Colorado went too far by authorizing a “remove and replace”
system. But so long as a state counts the independent vote, as Washington did,
the Supreme Court could find that states have the right to impose a fine on an
elector who violates his pledge.
However, such a split decision would be unwise. The Court must cleanly
decide whether the Constitution gives electors a choice in how they vote. If it
does, then punishment after the fact is every bit as much of a constitutional
violation as is removal before the fact.
III. AN ANALOGY BETWEEN JURORS AND ELECTORS
From the democratic point of view, it seems indefensible to suggest that
persons acting under color of law could ever be unaccountable for violating an
oath of office. And yet, that is the case with jurors. We swear jurors in and bind
them to follow the judge’s instructions on the law, whether they agree with them
or not. 53 But we do not and cannot punish them if they set aside the law to do
justice as they see it. We do not call them faithless jurors. We call them jurors
rendering verdicts according to their conscience. 54 In criminal trials, if jurors set
aside the law to acquit a criminal defendant, that verdict stands. To be sure, if
jurors convict against the law, an appellate court can throw out the conviction.
But in neither case can a juror be punished. So the strange phenomenon of actors
“bound by oath but not punishable” exists in law. The question is whether
electors are another example of constitutionally free actors—free in the sense
that they answer to no accountability mechanism for refusing to vote for the
winning candidate in their state.
The term “jury nullification” describes the power of juries to set aside the
law to acquit a defendant in the name of justice, even if fidelity to the law would
demand conviction. 55 Roughly speaking, independent electors engage in a kind

53
E.D. MICH., SAMPLE CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1–2, https://www.mied.uscourts.gov/pdffiles/
Clelandintroconcludinglanguage.pdf. (“It is my job to instruct you about the law, and you are bound by the oath
you took at the beginning of the trial to follow the instructions that I give you, even if you personally disagree
with one or more of them.”).
54
Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 959, 964 n. 28 (2006).
55
See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 57–
95 (2000).
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of nullification. They substitute their own choice of President for what their
lawful instructions demand.
Acts of nullification, whether done by jurors or electors, are inherently
dangerous. In trials, there can be a nullifying jury that acquits the obviously
guilty murderers of Emmett Till. 56 But there can also be jurors who nullify the
1850 Fugitive Slave Law in order to acquit a person who helped runaway
enslaved persons escape. 57 In the grandfather of all jury nullification cases, the
judge all but instructed the jury they would be violating their oaths if they
acquitted the Quaker William Penn, since Penn had proudly admitted violating
the law in order to pray to God. The jury struck a blow for religious freedom by
finding Penn not guilty. 58
As is the case with jurors, nullifying electors have given us the bad with the
good. In 1836, twenty-three electors from Virginia refused to support the
Democratic Party candidate for vice president, due to reports that he lived with
an enslaved African-American woman. 59 In 1948, thirty-nine electors reneged
on their pledge to vote for the Democratic victor in their states, Harry Truman,
joined the so-called “Dixiecrat” revolt, and cast votes for Strom Thurmond, the
losing candidate of the State’s Rights Party. 60
On the other hand, how legitimate was George W. Bush’s one-vote victory
in the Electoral College in 2000, in an election where he lost the popular vote to
Al Gore by half a million votes? It took the Supreme Court’s pulling the plug on
a recount of disputed votes in Florida to award Bush that state’s twenty-five
votes, just enough to make him President. 61 Would it have been that wrong, in
such circumstances, for two or more Florida electors to have abstained on the
grounds that the popular vote in Florida was flawed?
For juries, rather than eliminating acts of nullification entirely, courts try to
tame them. We do not instruct or even acknowledge to jurors that they are free
to nullify. 62 In fact, we do the opposite. We require a pledge or oath to apply the
56
Id. at 111–12; see also STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL
42 (1991).
57
ABRAMSON, supra note 55, at 80–82.
58
Id. at 68–73.
59
THOMAS H. NEALE, CONTINGENT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BY CONGRESS:
PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS 6 (2016).
60
Wilfred U. Codrington III, Can the Members of the Electoral College Choose Who They Vote For?,
BRENNAN CENT. JUST. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/can-memberselectoral-college-choose-who-they-vote.
61
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2000 (2000).
62
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F. 2d. 1113, 1137–38 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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law whether they agree with it or not. 63 But if jurors, so bound, feel strongly that
justice requires them to break their oaths, then we live with unprompted
outbreaks of nullification. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia put it, when a jury takes it upon itself to defy legal instructions, then
“the jury must feel strongly about the values involved in the case, so strongly
that it must identify the case as establishing a call of high conscience.” 64 Such
spontaneous acts of nullification prevent overly mechanical applications of the
law. 65
Until 2016, election law reached exactly this practical accommodation with
independent electors. A majority of states bound them by law to vote the popular
vote. Political parties took care to nominate party loyalists as electors, people
who could be trusted to vote for the party nominee whenever he or she carried
the state. But if even party loyalists felt strongly that they could not support their
party’s victorious candidate, states accepted and counted their ballots.
Nullifying jurors have changed verdicts. 66 With the exception of the 1836
election, where abstainers denied the Vice-Presidential victor a majority in the
Electoral College, thereby throwing the decision into the Senate, 67 independent
electors have never tilted the Electoral College outcome. Yet the possibility is
there, as the one-vote Bush electoral margin victory in 2000 shows.
But there are limits to the analogy between juror and elector. Normatively,
the question is whether the democratic defense that can be made for jury
independence can also be made for elector independence. Juries, by their
makeup and method of selection, have the democratic credentials to stand in for,
or represent, the community. 68 They can justify departures from the law because
they have the legitimacy that comes from being the most directly democratic
institution we have. 69

63

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Dougherty, 473 F. 2d. at 1136.
65
Id. at 1134 (quoting United States v. Moylan, 417 F.3d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969)).
66
See ABRAMSON, supra note 55, at 57–95.
67
See Kalt, supra note 1, at 111.
68
28 U.S.C. §1861 (2012) (stating that juries must be selected from a cross-section of the entire
community).
69
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION TO REVISE AND
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 458 (3d ed. 1853) (“Which is the best
tribunal to try [a] case? This man who sits upon the bench, and who has . . . nothing in common with the
people . . . ? Is he the better man to try the case than they who have the same stake in the community [as the
accused]?”).
64
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In the case of wayward electors, the democratic credentials are flipped. The
people have spoken and sent electors to deliver their choice. Nothing about
selecting a slate of electors gives that slate, or anyone on it, the democratic
credentials to depart from the popular vote.
Hamilton anticipated that electors, like jurors, would meet and deliberate.
But they don’t, at least as one body. 70 On the Monday following the second
Wednesday in December, electors meet in their several states and submit ballots
without conversation. On January 6, the ballots are opened and counted in a joint
session of Congress. The Electoral College never assembles as a whole.
Tellingly, the group-sounding word “college” does not even appear in the
Constitution. Thus, while juries give us the virtues of deliberative democracy by
giving people from different walks of life an opportunity to meet and educate
one another prior to voting, 71 electors do nothing of the sort. They simply vote.
And if all we are doing is counting votes, then it should be the people’s votes
that determine the Presidency and Vice Presidency, not the votes of electors.
The fact that jurors deliberate, while electors do not, is significant. Consider
this argument for juror independence. Keeping what is said in the jury room
private and confidential is necessary if jurors are to deliberate honestly and
fairly. This means that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the government
cannot investigate what was said in the jury room. 72 Since the government
cannot investigate jury behavior, we never know whether jurors did anything
wrong. 73
This defense of juror independence does not translate to electors, since for
them there is no privacy or deliberation to protect. To be sure, in other American
elections, we protect the privacy of the voting booth. But both Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment require electors to sign their names and certify their
ballots. 74 As the Washington Supreme Court noted: “[T]he names of every
70
See Norman R. Williams, The Danger of the National Popular Vote Compact, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1523, 1530 (2012) (“[T]he framers feared that, were all the electors to assemble in one place, they would engage
in vote-swapping and collusion.”).
71
United States v. Singletary, 562 F.2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is your duty, as jurors, to
consult with one another, and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement . . . .”).
72
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
73
See Thomas A. Green, Lights Hidden Under a Bushel’s Case, in TEXTS AND CONTEXTS IN LEGAL
HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHARLES DONAHUE 397–416 (J. Witte, S. McDougall & A. di Robilant eds.,
2016).
74
3 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). The state court rejected the argument that the use of the word “ballot” in Article
II and the Twelfth Amendment necessarily required secret balloting. A common meaning of “ballot” at the time
the constitutional provisions were ratified was simply “[a]n instrument for casting a vote.” In re Guerra, 441
P.3d 807, 816 n.8 (Wash. 2019).
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presidential elector is [sic] on a state’s certificate of ascertainment submitted to
Congress.” Indeed, in their brief to the Supreme Court opposing the grant of
certiorari, the state of Washington appended photographs of the signed ballot of
each of the independent electors—exactly the image we never have of voters in
the voting booth or jurors in the jury room. 75
Or consider the logic of a second argument against punishing jurors—the
one made by Chief Justice Vaughan in the famous Bushell’s Case that
established the modern jury system. 76 After acquitting William Penn of the
crime of unlawful assembly, jurors found themselves accused of perjury and
thrown into prison. 77 To the presiding judge, it was clear that the juror verdict
amounted to a lie, since the jurors well knew that the evidence showed an
unlawful assembly in the street had occurred. 78 After all, the judged noted, the
jury at one point came back and reported that while they could not agree on
whether Penn was guilty of unlawful assembly, they were agreed on the fact that
Penn had preached in the middle of Gracechurch Street. 79 The judge sent the
jury back to deliberate, instructing them that, as a matter of law, preaching in the
middle of a public thoroughfare made Penn guilty of an unlawful assembly. 80
Nonetheless, the jury eventually returned a verdict of not guilty. 81 The judge
accepted the verdict, released Penn, but then fined the jurors for committing
perjury. 82 They had to be lying when they pronounced Penn not guilty, the judge
concluded, since they had previously reported finding him guilty of preaching
in the middle of a public thoroughfare. 83
The jurors went off to prison until they could pay their fines. 84 Freeing them
of perjury charges, the highest British court reasoned as follows: How can an
appellate court ever know that a jury is lying? We make jurors the final finders
of the fact and, given the privacy of jury deliberations, the appellate court is not
privy to what facts the jury found to be true, or why. Perhaps the jury did not
believe the testimony that Penn attracted enough listeners to block the King’s
75
Brief of Respondent Washington in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chiafalo v.
Washington, Appendix, 39a–43a.
76
Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushel for Alleged Misconduct as a Juryman (1670), Vaughan
Rep. 135; 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670).
77
John A. Phillips and Thomas C. Thompson, Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart England: The Penn/Mead
Trial and Bushell’s Case, 4 L. & INEQUALITY 189, 190 (1986).
78
See id.
79
See id. at 196.
80
See id. at 208.
81
See id. at 209.
82
See id.
83
See ABRAMSON, supra note 55, at 68–73.
84
See id. at 190, 196.
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thoroughfare. Perhaps the jury had personal knowledge of the width of the street,
the numbers in the crowd, or knew enough to doubt the credibility of the
Crown’s witnesses. For reasons such as these, the high court concluded, it is
impossible to accuse a jury of getting the evidence wrong. 85 But perhaps a court
could punish jurors for disobeying their oaths to follow the law? Since jurors
apply the law to the facts, as they find them, we can never know whether they
disregarded the law either, because we don’t know their understanding of the
facts. Depending on the jury’s understanding of the evidence, a verdict of guilty
or not guilty could each be a faithful application of the law.
This second argument against punishing jurors does not work any better than
the first as a reason to protect independent electors. We do know, and rather
easily, what we can never precisely know about jurors—that electors went
against their pledge. Jury decision-making takes place in a black box. Electoral
voting is a quasi-public act. Privacy is important for jury work; publicity is
important for the Electoral College. 86 As argued above, per the instructions in
the Twelfth Amendment, the electors are required to certify their own vote, seal
up the certificates, and send one copy to the President of the Senate.
IV. TURNING THE TABLES: RIGHTING THE WRONGS OF THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE
So far, I have argued that electors usually lack the democratic credentials
that justify granting jurors considerable independence, even from their oaths and
the law. However, there is one circumstance where so-called “faithless” electors
can claim democratic justification for voting against their instructions. As long
as we have an Electoral College, we run the risk, with or without independent
electors, of electing a president the people did not in fact elect. This is no
hypothetical. In four previous elections, including the 2016 election of Donald
Trump, the Electoral College delivered the presidency to the loser of the popular

85

See Green, supra note 73.
The Electoral College, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/the-electoral-college.aspx (“Each elector votes on his or her own ballot and
signs it.”).
86
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vote. 87 A recent study suggests that 2020 could be a fifth such election. 88 Faced
with such antidemocratic results, the faithless elector is paradoxically the one
keeping faith with the people. 89 Just as jurors sometimes need to defy the law to
do justice, electors sometimes need to do more than mechanically rubber stamp
an undemocratic result. They can serve as a lawful Trojan horse, sneaking
democracy back into the Electoral College. 90
It would be better to abolish the Electoral College. 91 But this seems unlikely,
87
These are: 1876 (Rutherford B. Hayes), 1888 (William Henry Harrison), 2000 (George W. Bush), and
2016 (Donald Trump). See Williams, supra note 70, at 1534. John Quincy Adams won the election of 1824,
even though he lost both the popular and electoral votes to Andrew Jackson. Since no one won a majority in the
Electoral College, the election was thrown into the House. With the support of electors pledged to Henry Clay,
Adams leapfrogged over Jackson and reached the necessary majority of electoral votes. In exchange for Clay’s
help, Adams named Clay his secretary of state. See Jones et. al., Created Equal, supra note 1, at 338 (Table
11.2). In several other elections, presidential candidates have won a majority of electoral votes even while
achieving only a plurality of the popular vote. This was true of the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 (39.8%
of popular vote), Woodrow Wilson in 1912 (41.9%), Harry Truman in 1948 (49.5%), John Kennedy in 1960
(49.9%), Richard Nixon in 1968 (43.4%), Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996 (43.1% and 49.2% respectively). Id. at
421 (Table 13.5); 597 (Table 19.4); 770 (Table 24.1), 803 (Table 25.2); 835 (Table 26.2); 911 (Table 29.1); and
913 (Table 29.2).
88
Vinod Bakthavachalam & Reed Hunt, Snatching Victory from the Jaws of Defeat, Again, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/12/opinion/electoral-college-2020.html (stating that a Democrat
could win the popular vote by a margin of eight to nine million votes in 2020, yet still lose the electoral vote).
89
Counsel for the Washington state electors who wrote in Colin Powell rather than Hillary Clinton argues
that they were being faithful to the will of the Clinton voters who elected them, doing what those voters would
have wanted them to do had they known that the Electoral College was about to elect the loser of the national
vote. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chiafolo v. Washington, No. 19-465 (oral argument set Apr. 28, 2020).
90
It could be argued that the winner of the Electoral College should not be punished for playing by the
rules of the game. For instance, in 2016 Trump had little incentive to campaign in California, since he was never
going to win that state’s popular vote. But, if the rules had been the winner of the popular vote takes the
Presidency, then presumably Trump would have sought more votes in California and might then have won the
national popular vote.
91
Defenders of the Electoral College offer three arguments in its favor. First, they credit the current
system with promoting national as opposed to merely regional political parties. The Electoral College does this
by giving “candidates the incentive to bring together a broad, nationwide coalition that can compete in the
different regions of the nation.” John Yoo, A Defense of the Electoral College in the Time of Trump, 46 PEPP. L.
REV. 101, 156 (2019). For instance, consider a candidate with a geographically narrow but numerically
overwhelming advantage among voters clustered in the major cities on each coast. Such a candidate might win
the popular vote, and yet fail to muster a majority of electoral votes. Id. at 156–57. Secondly, supporters see the
electoral college as serving the country’s interest in certainty on election night. Id. at 158. In a tight election
where the outcome of the popular vote might depend on resolving disputes over contested ballots, the nation
need not wait the days it might take to resolve those disputes, if on election night one candidate has already won
270 electoral votes. Thirdly, in elections where no candidate wins a majority of the popular vote, the electoral
college system arguably enhances the legitimacy of the plurality vote winner. Id. at 157. I do not address all
these defenses in this Essay. However, the election of 2000 stands out as a recent counterexample, where the
electoral system did not produce a certain winner on election night, although the popular vote did, or would
have, had it been determinative of the outcome. See supra note 61. As to legitimacy, defenders of the Electoral
College have little to say about the ever-present possibility that the system might actually de-legitimize
presidents who lose the popular vote.
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even though two-thirds of Americans oppose it. 92 To date, almost 700 attempts
to pass a constitutional amendment eliminating the Electoral College have failed
in Congress. 93 Three major obstacles stand in the way of abolishing the Electoral
College. First, less populous states may be unwilling to surrender the advantages
of the status quo. While this advantage can be exaggerated, 94 there is no doubt
that the system represents geography as well as population. 95 For example, the
civic group FairVote gives this example from the 2008 election. 96 That year, on
average, a state had one electoral vote for every 565,166 people. 97 However,
Wyoming had three electoral votes and a total population of only 532,668.98
Thus, surpassing the national average, one Wyoming elector voted for 177,556
people. 99 These numbers explain why smaller states have a vested interest in
preserving the Electoral College. Second, elections frequently turn on the results
in key battleground states, such as Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. 100 Such states may also not rush to surrender
their Electoral College clout. Third, at any point in time, one party or the other
is likely to find the Electoral College math working to its advantage.101
Even if there is little prospect of abolishing the Electoral College by
amendment, there is a political way to prevent the national vote going one way
and the electoral vote the other. This is for states holding a majority of electoral
votes (270) to agree to appoint electors who would cast those votes for the
winner of the national popular vote. The National Popular Interstate Compact
(NPVC) aims to do just that. 102 Currently, fifteen states plus the District of
Columbia, with a combined 196 electoral votes, have signed the compact. 103
92

Bakthavachalam & Hunt, supra note 88.
Past Attempts at Reform, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/past_attempts_at_reform (last visited
Mar. 30, 2020).
94
Nat Cohn, The Electoral College’s Big Problem: It’s Biased Toward the Big Battlegrounds, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/upshot/electoral-college-votes-states.html;
Wegman, supra note 2.
95
See, e. g., Williams, supra note 70, at 1527 (“[F]ramers . . . settled on the Electoral College as a way
to preserve the influence of the states, particularly smaller states . . . .”).
96
Population vs. Electoral Votes, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/the_electoral_college#
population_vs_electoral_votes (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Alex J. Tuchfarber, The Big Six Swing States in 2020, UVA CENT. POLS. (Aug. 22, 2019),
http://crystalball.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/the-big-six-swing-states-in-2020.
101
Michael Geruso, Dean Spears, & Ishaana Talesara, Inversions in US Presidential Elections: 1836-2016
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26247, 2019).
102
Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
103
Id.
93

ABRAMSONFINAL_4.14.20

2054

4/21/2020 3:33 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 69

Critics argue that the compact is unconstitutional. 104 Even if constitutional, the
proposal would not eliminate the possibility of independent electors. States
would only have whatever power they now have to replace wayward ballots. At
worst, the compact could add the problem of wayward states if, despite signing
the compact, states could desert the compact in March if unhappy with whom
the polls show is likely to win the national vote in November.
Another possible reform would be to do away with the “winner-take-all”
rule, which awards all of a state’s electoral votes to a candidate who may have
won the popular vote only by the slenderest of margins. All but two states have
such an all or nothing system. 105 By translating a close popular vote into a
lopsided Electoral College victory, the winner-take-all rule distorts results and
is the major reason a candidate can win the popular vote and yet lose the
presidency. 106 If we cannot abolish the Electoral College, we can at least lessen
its antidemocratic tendencies by allocating a state’s electoral votes in proportion
to a candidate’s share of the popular vote. But since electoral votes cannot be
split in half or thirds, the popular vote would have to be rounded up, or down, to
the nearest electoral vote. 107 In a tight election, the rounding error could actually
increase the danger of one or two independent electors tilting the election.
V. THE PROBLEM OF THE DEMAGOGUE
It may be helpful to distinguish between procedural and substantive
justifications for granting electors a measure of independence. A procedural
justification is when an elector votes to reinforce the norms of electoral
democracy, by voting in favor of the winner of the national vote. A substantive
justification is when an elector rejects the popular choice as objectively wrong
or dangerous.
104
Article I, §10, cl. 3 of the Constitution stipulates that “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .” It is an open question whether the NPVC is
the kind of compact that requires Congressional approval. See United States Steel v. Multistate Tax Commission,
434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978) (suggesting that the Compact Clause applies to any agreement among states “that
would enhance the political power of the member States in a way that encroaches upon the supremacy of the
United States”). For another argument as to why the NPVC might be unconstitutional, see Williams, supra note
70, at 1527 (under Article II, § 1, states do not have the power to select electors based on the votes of citizens of
other states).
105
Maine and Nebraska award one elector to the popular vote winner of each congressional district in the
state and two electors to the statewide winner. Split Electoral Votes in Maine and Nebraska, 270 TO WIN,
https://www.270towin.com/content/split-electoral-votes-maine-and-nebraska/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
106
See, e.g., Winner Take All Is Unfair, EQUAL CITIZENS, https://equalcitizens.us/equal-votes ((last visited
Mar. 30, 2020) (stating that Trump carried Michigan by only 10,000 votes in 2016, and yet got all sixteen of that
state’s electoral votes).
107
Wegman, supra note 2.
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As previously mentioned, the authors of the Federalist Papers expected
electors to exercise some amount of independent, substantive judgment. 108 As
students of classical history, they knew that previous republics had fallen prey
to demagogues, skillful at manipulating the people. The very first of the
Federalist Papers brings up the threat of the demagogue, and the very last returns
to this Achilles heel of popular government. 109 In light of this danger, they
designed the Electoral College to function in part as a fail-safe mechanism for
saving the people from themselves.
Together with indirect election of Senators, 110 and provisions for
impeaching and removing elected presidents, the Electoral College was part of
an original constitutional design of filters between the people and their
representatives. But the Seventeenth Amendment ended the democratic anomaly
of the indirect election of Senators. 111 Impeachment has occurred only three
times, and a president has never been removed. The Electoral College lingers,
in theory, as important a check on the election of a demagogue as ever. But this
is a theory that makes sense only in the abstract. 112 It has no concrete application
to the country we became a long time ago.
Here we come to a major difference between jury trials and elections. While
there is a correct verdict in many jury trials, there is no such thing as a correct
result in a presidential election. If we knew the correct result, we wouldn’t have
to hold elections in the first place. So, we should resist turning to electors as if
they were last minute Platonic guardians with the power to save us from
ourselves. 113 While the procedurally-minded elector (violating one’s pledge in
order to vote for the winner of the popular vote) is faithful to democratic norms,
the substantively-minded elector (the people have made a bad choice) is not.

108

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (“History will teach us that . . . of those men who have
overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court
to the people, commencing demagogues and ending tyrants.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton)
(noting the need to guard against “the military despotism of a victorious demagogue . . . ”).
110
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
111
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (1913).
112
See, e. g., In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 815 (Wash. 2019) (constitutional interpretation “should reflect
. . . the historic reality”); see also Baca v. Colorado, 935 F. 3d 887, 936 (10th Cir. 2019) (constitutional
interpretation of the Electoral College provisions “ought to receive a considerable impression from . . .
practice”).
113
Michael Signer, The Electoral College was Designed to Stop Demagogues Like Trump, TIME (Nov. 17,
2016), https://time.com/4575119/electoral-college-demagogues.
109
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CONCLUSION
Until 2016, an independent elector was like a disobedient juror in three
important respects. First, each took an oath of office—the juror to follow the
law, the elector to follow the popular vote in one’s state. Second, neither could
be removed from office for violating the respective oaths. Third, neither could
be punished.
This similarity between elector and juror ended in 2016 when Washington
punished electors for their independent votes, and Colorado removed its
independent elector, threw out the offending ballot, and replaced the elector with
another. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in both cases.
The legal issue turns on a normative question about democratic
accountability. Jurors are an exception to the basic principle that officeholders
be held accountable for violating their oaths of office. Although we do not
encourage jury nullification of the law, we live with it, because jurors enjoy the
distinct democratic legitimacy that comes from being the most directly
democratic of our institutions. Jurors are not representatives, in the sense of
having constituents to represent. Instead, they are as close to the people
governing themselves as we get.
In general, independent electors cannot not make the same sort of democratic
argument for their independent voice. However, this Essay has identified one
circumstance—and it is an important and recurrent one—where independent
electors, like disobedient jurors, have democratic justification for violating their
oaths. This is when a presidential candidate loses the popular vote and yet is
about to win the Electoral College. At such a moment, the democratic tables are
turned. The so-called “faithless” elector becomes the one showing faith in
democracy, by voting the people’s will.

